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John Paul MacDuffie, PhD

In March, news broke that a self-driving car belonging to Uber accidentally struck
and killed a pedestrian in Arizona.
It was the first non-passenger death caused by an
autonomous vehicle (AV ) in the United States. Two
years earlier, in May 2016, Tesla made headlines when
one of its cars with automated capabilities collided
with a truck on a Florida highway while in “Autopilot” mode, killing the driver who had not responded
to the car’s sensors beckoning him to reassume full
control of the driving task. That incident will forever
be remembered as the first “self-driving” car death.1
Despite the daily tragedies that unfold across the
U.S., which witnessed 37,461 driving-related deaths
in 2016, stories like these become breaking news
because of their intrigue.2 A future with self-driving
cars dominating the streets and highways of America
could mean far fewer driving-related deaths, and it’s
a future sought by government (at all levels), industry,
and many of the potential users of these vehicles. But
when accidents inevitably occur during these years of
technological development, many people reasonably
ask, “What risks are we (society) willing to accept
to advance this technology?” and “What are policymakers doing to mitigate these risks?” The American
public will need to answer these questions many times
over in the coming years, but the federal government
has already made its preferences clear, at least for
the moment.

SUMMARY
• As automobile crashes are tremendously costly both in terms
of human fatalities and economic losses, and typically result
from human error, the development of autonomous vehicles
(AVs) has become a priority at all levels of government.
• But the development of AVs has not been casualty-free, thus
raising a key question: How do we best promote AV innovation
while ensuring public safety?
• The current flexibility states enjoy in regulating AV technology
and safety, while desirable from the perspective of supporting
exploration and experimentation for learning purposes, has
created an inefficient patchwork of guidance across the country.
• H.R. 3388, or the SELF-DRIVE Act, would potentially address
this problem by enforcing a uniform standard for both technology
and safety, while also barring states from blocking the use of
AVs without human controls within their borders.
• As a general rule, such a paradigm of regulatory consistency
that boosts innovation would enhance safety too, given the
iterative nature of software and technology development.
• Beyond H.R. 3388, there are many tools available to government
lawmakers and regulators to foster such innovation. This brief
looks at several, including new voluntary federal policy guidance, the development of a standardized AV “driver’s license
test,” infrastructure investments, and geofencing and other
local policy initiatives.
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In September 2016, the U.S.
Department of Transportation
through its National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA)
published non-binding performance
guidance in order to facilitate the
development of AVs, offering a
consistent regulatory regime to the
carmakers and technology companies
competing to bring self-driving cars
to market.3 This document included
a 15-point safety assessment for
developers and model state policy.
One year later, NHTSA updated its
guidance,4 and in the same week, the
U.S. House passed H.R. 3388—the
SELF-DRIVE Act—a standard setting piece of legislation that seeks to
further advance the innovation of this
technology.5 Both the NHTSA guidance and H.R. 3388 have important
implications, as we will discuss, but
what these measures make immediately clear is that federal lawmakers
and regulators are working alongside
private industry to boost innovation
in ways that, in other policy contexts,
they so often do not.
There are concerns from consumer
advocates and other parties that these
proposed measures put the safety of
Americans at undue risk, and we will
address these in turn. But there is no
disagreement as to why the federal

government is trying to stay ahead of
and support this burgeoning technology. The aforementioned 37,461
deaths in 2016 represent a 14%
increase from 2014.6 According to
NHTSA, “94 percent of crashes can
be tied to a human choice or error,”
so removing human judgment from
the driving equation could save many
lives.7 Not only that, AVs would allow
increased mobility to those with disabilities, revolutionize the auto industry, and potentially decrease economic
losses from crashes, which may have
been as high as $836 billion in 2010.8
How exactly we arrive at a future
with fully automated cars is still
largely up for debate, and in this Issue
Brief we will examine the inflection
points in two sequential phases. In
the first phase, we will address the
benefits and costs of setting uniform
standards—for both technology and
safety—versus allowing for flexibility
at the state or local levels in establishing these standards. As part of that
discussion, we will review the current
legislation proposed in Congress and
the actions undertaken by several
states up to this point. In phase two,
we assume that public support for
developing AVs holds at least until
2021—the year many companies have
promised to deliver large scale rollouts

of AVs—and highlight how federal
lawmakers and regulators can mitigate
near-term safety risks while facilitating innovation.
This Issue Brief also serves as a
snapshot of the state of AVs in the
U.S. at a crucial moment, when the
costs (in terms of human lives) of
developing self-driving technology are
already materializing but before any
binding federal legislation establishes
firm legal parameters. Regardless of
the fate of H.R. 3388, many policy
challenges and opportunities lie ahead.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AV
TECHNOLOGY
In 2017, Waymo—Google’s selfdriving car company—filed a lawsuit
against Uber, claiming that the ridesharing company stole trade secrets
when a former Waymo employee
left to work for Uber. The case was
intriguing, both for some of its odd
details, but also because of the trade
secrets at the heart of the dispute.
Uber allegedly stole Waymo’s Lidar
designs. Lidar is a highly specialized
sensor that, in conjunction with cameras, radar, and various other sensors,
helps a self-driving car “see.”9 Lidar
estimates distances (from lane markings and road edges) by using illumi-

NOTES
Less than a week after the recent Uber accident, a Tesla
crash—again caused by an Autopilot error—resulted in
the death of another driver. Executives from other companies were quick to point out that such incidents are not
representative of the AV industry as a whole, with some
(e.g., Waymo CEO John Krafcik) going so far as to say that
their company’s technology would have prevented these
accidents.
2 See https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812451.
3 U.S. Department of Transportation (2016), Federal Auto1

mated Vehicles Policy, available at https://www.transportation.gov/AV/federal-automated-vehicles-policy-september-2016.
4 U.S. Department of Transportation (2017), Automated Driving Systems 2.0, available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/
nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-ads2.0_090617_
v9a_tag.pdf.
5 H.R. 3388 available at https://www.congress.gov/115/
bills/hr3388/BILLS-115hr3388eh.pdf.
6 The uptick in accident-related deaths, which many attribute to increased instances of distracted driving, occurred

2

despite the addition of more safety features to passenger
cars, and despite the steady reduction in accident-related
deaths in the decades prior to 2014. For data on U.S.
accident death rates, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Motor_vehicle_fatality_rate_in_U.S._by_year.
7 Singh, S. (2015), Critical reasons for crashes investigated
in the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey.
(Traffic Safety Facts Crash Stats. Report No. DOT HS 812
115). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
8 See https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPubli-
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nated, invisible lasers. Unlike the other
hardware upon which self-driving cars
rely, Lidar is expensive to mass-produce, although great strides have been
made in the last few years to make it
more affordable. In February 2018, just
five days into the trial, Uber settled out
of court, paying Waymo $245 million
and granting its competitor oversight
rights for reviewing the future development of Uber’s Lidar technology.10
Uber initially offered to settle for a
larger sum, but Waymo accepted the
relatively lower settlement amount in
exchange for the ability to monitor the
way Uber develops Lidar on its own
and integrates that hardware with
its software.
In general, AVs are the result of
successful hardware-software integration and the melding of digital and
automotive components. As Rahul
Mangharam of the University of
Pennsylvania describes, AVs continuously execute a three-step process.11
First, they must perceive all of their
surroundings. Then, using all of the
data gathered by the hardware, they
must plan their routes and how they
will navigate the changing landscape.
For this, AVs need advanced processing computers and complex software
to guide their decision-making. The
final step is the act of driving itself:

they must accelerate, brake, and
maneuver on the road without human
intervention. All three steps pose
problems, technologically and policywise. The abruptness with which
Waymo settled its case with Uber
underscores the fact that hardware
alone is not the greatest obstacle facing
these companies. It is the algorithms
undergirding the software in selfdriving cars that will be an especially
significant focus of regulation in the
coming years.
Since even a brief scan of news
articles reveals that terms like “automated,” “autonomous,” and “self-driving” are used interchangeably—despite
different people having different
interpretations of each term—it is
important for there to be a consistent
means of describing the many levels of
automation.12 Accordingly, NHTSA
has adopted SAE International’s definitions for distinguishing the different
levels of automation.13 All companies
competing to market AVs—whether
they are carmakers like Ford, GM, or
Daimler, or technology companies like
Waymo, Uber, or nuTonomy—have
accepted these definitions as their targets, despite there being disagreements
about whether Level 3 automation is
even marketable (see Figure 1).
Carmakers have different beliefs

about how ultimately to attain full
autonomy. Toyota, for example, subscribes to the idea of “human in the
loop,” which involves human drivers
doing most of the driving most of the
time, but the automated system (AS)
would kick in during a dangerous situation, like fishtailing. Tesla’s approach
is essentially the opposite: the AS will
handle all routine driving scenarios
but will alert the human driver to
retake control of the wheel (through a
combination of bright lights, auditory alerts, and physical sensors in the
seats) whenever unpredictable circumstances develop. Meanwhile, Waymo
and Ford believe Level 3 automation
is not even feasible due to safety concerns. They argue that forcing a distracted rider to assume control of the
driving task and to monitor the road
environment in a matter of seconds is
too risky, especially at higher speeds.
For this reason, Waymo cars will not
even have steering wheels or pedals.14
Most carmakers, however, have been
silent on this debate, implying that
most believe Level 3 automation is
achievable and marketable in increments. In theory, Level 3 cars could
reach the market faster, as they have
fewer NHTSA regulations with which
to contend. The first challenge for
either Level, however, is the current

provides a concise list, which includes the following: automatic emergency braking, adaptive cruise control, adaptive
lighting, backup cameras, park assist, forward collision
warning, lane keeping assist, lane departure warning,
blind spot detection, and automatic crash notification (e.g.,
OnStar). Automated cars have been available to consumers
for a long time. The lab and road tests that companies are
conducting now, in fact, involve developing Level 3 and
Level 4 capabilities. Audi has claimed to have even created the first car with Level 3 automation, but they assert
that they are unable to deploy it anywhere in the world

because of excessive liability and the lack of governmental
permission. See Michael Taylor, “The Level 3 Audi A8 Will
Almost Be the Most Important Car in the World,” Forbes,
September 10, 2017.
13 U.S. DOT, supra note 3.
14 Will Oremus, “The Big Problem with Self-Driving Cars,”
Slate, September 8, 2015.
15 For the source of Figure 2, see Gabriel Weiner and Bryant
Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory
Action, available at cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/
Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action.

NOTES
cation/812013.
Cameras are best for object recognition; radar and LIDAR are
both good at distance; but only LIDAR (short for light direction
and ranging) provides sharp 3-D images, accurate distance,
and high ability to recognize objects in all light conditions.
10 See https://www.uber.com/newsroom/uber-waymosettlement/.
11 Jason Laughlin, “Can driverless cars be safe? Grand Theft Auto
helps Penn scientists find out,” Philly.com, December 6, 2017.
12 Today, there are numerous examples of Level 1 and Level
2 automation present in many cars on the market. NHTSA
9

3
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cars on their roads. The map in Figure
2 shows where legislation has and has
not been passed that would authorize
AV testing.15 Arizona (red on the
map because state legislation failed)
has actually been the preferred testing
ground for companies like Waymo and
Uber because of active promotion by
state and local officials. This is in keeping with the general presumption that
experimentation is allowed . . . until it

is not.
At the federal level, it is currently illegal to operate AVs without
human controls on U.S. roads. The
states noted in Figure 2, however, have
passed a variety of different rules on
everything from what can be tested
and where, to what data AV companies are required to share with state
officials for safety monitoring purposes. And most state laws do include
provisions requiring a human driver
“in the loop” to help protect against
accidents, although the recent Uber
incident is evidence of the risks still
inherent in road tests. States that
have higher emissions standards, such
as California and Massachusetts,
also obligate AV companies to
account for that variable in any new
AV test designs.
The current flexibility states
enjoy in regulating AV technology
and safety, while desirable from the
perspective of allowing for exploration
and experimentation for learning purposes, has created an inefficient patchwork of guidance across the country.
States are free to disregard NHTSA’s
model state policy, of course, and
many have, but in publishing these
documents, NHTSA has reaffirmed
its authority to oversee the changing
auto industry.16 The non-binding guid-

Are Both More and Less Than They Seem,” The Center for
Internet and Society, October 23, 2017.
20 Sarah Light, “Autonomous Vehicle Bill Leaves Safety Gaps,”
The Regulatory Review, September 25, 2017.
21 S. 1885 available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/1885/text.
22 Eric Kulisch, “Safety groups say Congress has given selfdriving companies too much leeway,” Automotive News,
March 22, 2018.
23 Historically, federal law has covered vehicles and state law
has covered drivers – hence the confusion about what is ap-

propriate at the state level for a vehicle with no human driver.
Laughlin, supra note 10.
25		 There is more than one pathway to achieving V2V communication capability. Two leading contenders are DSRC
(Dedicated Short Range Communications) technology and
5G, the next telecom standard.
26 See http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/.
27 See http://fortune.com/2018/02/06/volkswagen-vwemissions-scandal-penalties/.
28 For a good overview of how AVs will reshape the auto insurance industry, see John Cusano and Michael Costonis,

FIGURE 1 THE FIVE LEVELS OF VEHICLE AUTONOMY
SAE
level

Name

Execution of
Steering and
Acceleration
Deceleration

Monitoring
of Driving
Environment

Failback
Performance
of Dynamic
Driving Task

System
Capability
(Driving
Modes)

Human driver monitors the driving environment
0

No
Automation

Human
Driver

Human
Driver

Human
Driver

n/a

1

Driver
Assistance

Human Driver
and system

Human
Driver

Human
Driver

Some driving
modes

2

Partial
Automation

System

Human
Driver

Human
Driver

Some driving
modes

Automated driving system (“system”) monitors the driving environment
3

Conditional
Automation

System

System

Human
Driver

Some driving
modes

4

High
Automation

System

System

System

Some driving
modes

5

Full
Automation

System

System

System

All driving
modes

lack of legal parameters. Which states
or localities will even allow them on
their roads?

PHASE 1: THE CHALLENGE
OF LEGISLATING A UNIFORM
STANDARD
States have differed widely as to their
interest in and approaches toward
allowing the testing of Level 3 and 4
NOTES
Specifically, NHTSA has reaffirmed its “authority to identify
safety defects, allowing the Agency to recall vehicles or
equipment that pose an unreasonable risk to safety even
when there is no applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS).”
17 U.S. DOT, supra note 3.
18 After a concerted lobbying effort from labor groups concerned about the economic impacts on their members
from automation, self-driving commercial trucks were not
included in this legislation.
19 Bryant Walker Smith, “Congress’s Automated Driving Bills
16

4

24
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ance offered by NHTSA in each of the
past two years has helped to provide
some additional assurance to AV companies that the federal government,
absent legislation, is eager to boost
innovation and is being careful not to
set too many boundaries. The language
and content of these documents were
favorable to companies developing
AVs, and most companies will likely
operate within the established bounds.
Neither document picked winners or
losers and both presented uniform
standards for algorithms and technology that would be applicable across all
states—something manufacturers will
ultimately need. But just as important, they upheld currently mandated
federal safety standards and confirmed
that states should retain their “traditional responsibilities for vehicle
licensing and registration, traffic laws
and enforcement, and motor vehicle
insurance and liability regimes.”17
Despite the NHTSA guidance,
current legislative proposals would
restrict the flexibility that states currently enjoy. H.R. 3388, or the SELFDRIVE Act, now awaiting a vote in
the Senate after passing the House
with unanimous support in September, would enforce a uniform standard
for both technology and safety, and

FIGURE 2 STATUS OF STATE LAWS ON SELF-DRIVING CARS

No State Laws
Passed
Under Consideration
Failed
This map shows the status of all state laws concerning self-driving cars as of April 2018. Additionally, Arizona (2015) and Massachusetts
(2016) issued state executive orders facilitating the testing of AVs on public roadways.
Source: Gabriel Weiner and Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action, cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/
Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action

it would bar states from being able to
block the use of AVs without human
controls within their borders. States
also would no longer be able to set
rules on AV production and testing
standards. Under this bill, self-driving
carmakers could seek exemptions from
existing safety standards in the first
year for up to 25,000 cars—a measure
meant to accelerate production. This

NOTES
“Driverless Cars Will Change Auto Insurance. Here’s How
Insurers Can Adapt,” Harvard Business Review, December
5, 2017.
29 Corporate Partnership Board (2015), Automated and
Autonomous Driving: Regulation under Uncertainty, International Transport Forum (OECD).
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number rises to 100,000 over the next
three years.18 For their part, manufacturers of self-driving cars would
be required to demonstrate that their
AVs are at least as safe as traditional
cars. They would have to submit
“safety evaluation reports” to NHTSA,
including data related to crashes and
cybersecurity, thereby formalizing the
earlier NHTSA guidance. But they
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would not need NHTSA approval
of their unique technologies before
bringing their cars to market.
There are various perspectives
on how H.R. 3388 deals with safety.
Bryant Walker Smith of the University of South Carolina School of Law
generally supports the bill’s approach
to safety, as it follows what he calls
the “public safety case.”19 This is the
idea that as long as “an automated
driving developer tells the rest of us
what they are doing, why they think it
is reasonably safe, and why we should
believe them,” this paradigm “encourages innovation in safety assurance
and regulation, informs regulators,
and—if disclosure is meaningful—
helps educate the public at large.” He
emphasizes that H.R. 3388 increases
the obligations of AV companies relative to existing federal law.
Sarah Light of the Wharton
School, however, elucidates a serious
concern shared by many consumer
advocates. Specifically, she notes that
in addition to preempting all state
safety standards, H.R. 3388 actually
mandates none at the federal level,
leaving a significant gap in regulation.
Acknowledging the benefits to innovation and economies of scale from
uniform technology standards, Light
states, “[P]reempting state action
even in the absence of federal safety
standards fails to take into account
the significant concerns that states
have in protecting their citizens from
harm.”20 She proposes that a state
exemption for safety-setting authority
be added to the final measure.
The bill now moves to the Senate,
which had been considering S. 1885
(the bipartisan AV START Act) in
committee, to decide how to reconcile

their preferences with H.R. 3388.21 If
the Senate uses S. 1885 as a guide, the
next iteration of this legislation could
include language that preempts even
more state functions, including some
of the same things NHTSA recently
affirmed in its guidance: vehicle
registration and licensing, traffic law
enforcement, and regulating insurance. But several lawmakers are using
Senate procedures to hold up the AV
START Act in committee because of
concerns about safety, cybersecurity,
and data privacy, demanding explicit
testing and access to micro-level data
from AV companies.22
Between the concerns from
consumer safety advocates and the
trouble faced by S. 1885, it may be
that any Senate-passed version of
the SELF-DRIVE Act would make
concessions on safety authority. In
general, however, regulatory consistency across U.S. states that boosts
innovation will enhance safety, given
the iterative nature of software and
technology development.

PHASE 2: NON-LEGISLATIVE
POLICY OPPORTUNITIES FOR
PROMOTING AV INNOVATION
The SELF-DRIVE Act is most likely
not the final word on how regulators
will seek to balance the facilitation
of innovation with the ensuring of
public and consumer safety. Even if
it becomes law and preempts state
safety-setting authority, states and
municipalities will continue working to fill the regulatory gaps, as they
still have a responsibility for protecting their citizens.23 Conflicts may be
inevitable, but they will be workable.
Yet regardless of whether H.R. 3388,
6

or a bill like it, becomes law, there are
many opportunities for government
lawmakers and regulators at all levels
to foster innovation in AV technology
without singling out automated cars
via dedicated federal legislation. State
exemptions and executive actions,
new voluntary federal policy guidance,
state and federal appropriations, and
local policy initiatives are all tools still
available to do this. We will discuss
some of them here.
1. JOINING THE LEVEL 3 VS. LEVEL 4
AUTOMATION DEBATE

In the presence of new information,
NHTSA performance and safety
guidance could change. Thus far, the
U.S. government has shied away from
making its own judgment on the
debate over Level 3 viability. Carmakers clearly prefer the incremental
pathway to market offered by Level
3 automation, but if this proves too
risky, the voluntary federal guidance
could shift towards directly favoring
the Waymo approach of bypassing
“human in the loop” and shooting for
Level 4 automation as the next milestone. The current guidance is prudent given the information available,
because should Level 3 automation
prove to be safe and marketable, it
would be an overreach for the government to already be picking winners.
This debate may end up being one of
the most pivotal strategic, technical,
and regulatory issues. Then again, from
a regulatory perspective at least, it may
not. Level-specific evaluation may be
possible in the future (see #2, below),
and the government may never need to
interject itself in this industry debate.
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2. ENFORCING A SINGLE
STANDARD FOR PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION AND ETHICAL
DILEMMAS

Rahul Mangharam’s team of scientists at the University of Pennsylvania is developing what they call
a “driver’s license test” for selfdriving cars. Using “mathematical
diagnostics and simulated reality,”
Mangharam’s test seeks to evaluate the safety of AVs before they
ever reach public roads24—a clear
distinction from H.R. 3388’s reliance on company disclosures of
“safety evaluation reports” and its
automatic green light to market
cars without NHTSA pre-approval.
He has argued that independent
federal evaluation of technological
performance and safety offers the
most publicly desirable trajectory,
and these evaluations could develop
and improve as years go by and more
data is gathered and processed. The
tests could even be adjusted by automation level.
The logic behind giving cars a
“driver’s license” is sound, especially
as the industry progresses to higher
levels of automation. It is anyone’s
guess whether an independent test
or the reliance on company disclosures and data (or both) will ultimately win out. But one scenario
will almost inevitably be subject
to a uniform standard for evaluation, namely the loss-loss situation.
Algorithms have already been (and
will continue to be) written to deal
with how an AV will respond to a
scenario where damage, injury, or
even death is unavoidable regardless
of the car’s actions. These algorithms
are plain attempts at solving dilem-

mas, which is clearly the domain
of public policy when the decision
maker is a piece of software marketed to consumers. How society—
and eventually policymakers—judges
the ethical soundness of any line of
code is, again, still up in the air.
3. INVESTING IN INFRASTRUCTURE
There are two camps on the question of whether significant infrastructure investment—in the form
of repainted lane markings, repaired
and increased safety signage, and
newly paved roads—would be a
boon or a red herring to the development of self-driving cars. These
camps are divided on their answers
to the question of how much
connectivity is required to make
AVs safe.
In one camp are proponents of
an older way of thinking about the
relationships between different AVs
on the road and between an AV
and the road itself. They argue that
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V ) communication is essential.25 Not only will
we need a single mandated closed
and controlled communication
system for AVs—something akin to
air traffic control—but we will need
to retrofit all vehicles on the road to
have this capacity, according to this
position. Furthermore, they argue
that AV safety requires good “smart”
infrastructure (V2I). In practice,
it is highly unlikely there will ever
be a single communication system,
in large part because there will be
too many competing algorithms.
Besides that, car companies have
never agreed on standards and they
certainly do not, in most instances,
view this issue the same way most
7

technology companies do. And it is
technology companies and small AV
start-ups leading the other camp.
The original breakthrough
moment for self-driving cars was
when a research team from Carnegie
Mellon entered and won DARPA’s
third and final competition of selfdriving cars in 2007 (“Urban Challenge”).26 Identifying the inherent
software advantages that technology
companies had in turning non-automated cars into AVs, Google entered
the fray. Their philosophy involved
turning an AV into an independent
cell that would not be reliant upon
direct communication from other
cars or upon upgraded or smart
infrastructure. This approach has
greatly accelerated the development
of AVs.
The problem with Google’s philosophy, however, is that treating AVs
as independent cells can only move
the technology most of the way
to peak safety. In order to perfect
self-driving technology, most experts
believe V2V and/or V2I communication is still necessary. Even if the
Google approach is 90-95% effective
at avoiding collisions, there is a very
small chance the American public
will accept that outcome, given the
public’s well-established low tolerance for automobile failures. There
seems to be an opportunity here
for states to reopen debates over
infrastructure investment given the
potential benefits to the future of
self-driving cars, presupposing they
can get the timing right. Put another
way, the quality of America’s infrastructure is not the red herring it
occasionally is made out to be.
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4. LINKING AV TESTING TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

In the face of all of these competing philosophies, there is one thing
nearly every AV engineer agrees on:
geo-fencing. That is, the practice
of limiting the activity of AVs to
specific geographic areas that are
mapped in great detail (and perhaps
have dedicated lanes for AVs) is
the best way to advance driverless
technology. The need for geo-fencing
is one of the primary differences
between Level 4 and Level 5 automation. Beyond certain geo-fenced
areas, autonomy will not be assured
during the years of testing. Cities
naturally are the best-suited environments for geo-fencing, and this
presents interesting opportunities for
local governments.
Some cities such as Austin and
Pittsburgh have had, in some cases,
fleets of AVs on their roads for a
few years now, despite the fact that
their states have passed no explicit
AV public testing rules. Cities open
up their roads to Level 3 and Level
4 road testing for different reasons
and with various expectations, and
they likely will continue to be more
active than states in setting parameters in the short-term. Because they
offer ideal testing conditions for AV
companies, they have some leverage
to impose demands not necessarily
related to autonomous driving.
Here is one hypothetical example.
Cities could make AV testing contingent upon self-driving cars meeting
certain environmental standards.
Ever since “Dieselgate,” there has
been a massive uptick in public interest on the topic of fostering electric
vehicles.27 Despite the absence of

both federal rules and any explicit
technological linkage, cities could
demand that a certain percentage of
AVs be electric vehicles, at least during the testing phase. In this manner, local governments could push
the industry towards self-driving
cars that also happen to be greener,
should that be a local priority.
5. EXPANDING PUBLIC INSURANCE
AND SUPPORTING PRIVATE
INSURANCE

Today, private automotive insurance
provides a third-party check on the
safety of individual drivers. But how
does insurance work when there are
no drivers? Assuming that, as cars
become fully automated, liability
gradually will shift from drivers to
AV manufacturers, some early-stage
ideas include insuring trips or routes
instead of humans, insuring against
cyber attacks, and insuring against
product liability like “software bugs,
memory overflow, and algorithm
defects.”28 Precisely how this shift
in liability will unfold is unknown,
but it likely will involve some degree
of public insurance, at least during
a period of transition. As a report
from the Corporate Partnership
Board states, “Expanding public
insurance and facilitating greater
private insurance could provide
sufficient compensation to those
injured by an automated vehicle
while relieving some of the pressure
on the tort system to provide such a
remedy.”29
Automotive insurance companies
worry about the potential lack of
access to data. If they are compelled
to purchase AV performance data
directly from manufacturers via
8

private business transactions, that
process could become exceedingly
expensive. Private automotive insurance is desirable from the government’s perspective, so regulators may
encounter a scenario in which they
must mandate access to AV performance data for insurance companies.

CONCLUSION
As this Issue Brief makes clear,
there are ample technological, safety,
and ethical problems for carmakers,
technology companies, legislators,
and regulators to address before
2021—and beyond. Whether or not
the U.S. Congress passes legislation mandating some uniform AV
performance and safety standards
in the short-term, there are plenty
of other policy opportunities available at all levels of government for
boosting innovation and ensuring
public and consumer safety. Selfdriving cars may come to dominate
the auto market in the next two
decades and completely reshape the
way Americans think about and use
transportation, especially if (as many
predict) AV companies introduce
their vehicles through their own
ride-hailing platforms. There may be
a dramatic reduction in car-related
crashes, fatalities, and economic
losses as automation improves. And
the economic impacts of AVs on
jobs and the economy as a whole are
unclear. All of these questions are the
subjects of ongoing research that will
need to inform how policymakers
approach regulating the future of AV
testing and development.
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